The Argument Against Going After al-Qaeda Leadership

Anwar never saw it coming

Anwar al-Awlaki

The U.S. government on Friday trumpeted the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric who rose to the top of al Qaeda in Yemen. He was taken out by a CIA-operated drone missile as he sat in a vehicle with another American radical, reportedly the editor of an online jihadist magazine.

Awlaki’s death comes in the midst of a contentious debate between the State Department and the Pentagon: In its ongoing efforts to prevent another terrorist attack, can the United States use drone missiles to kill suspected terrorists? And what if those suspects are far from any battlefield, in countries with whom we are not at war? Getting Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking al Qaeda officials has been the focus of U.S. efforts so far, but that soon may change.

Prof. David Cole

David Cole, a professor of constitutional law, national security and criminal justice at Georgetown University Law Center, recently wrote about the implications of that discussion for the New York Review of Books. Editorial writer Linda Ocasio spoke with Cole about his thoughts on what the shift in strategy might mean for the United States and its relations with other nations.

Q. We’ve been told for the last 10 years that the war on terror is a war like no other. We’re fighting stateless terrorists, so why is it a problem to chase after them, no matter where they are?

A. First of all, it’s not a war on terror. That’s like having a war on poverty; it doesn’t make sense. Obama has avoided that rhetoric. It’s a war with the organization that attacked us on 9/11, al Qaeda, and the group that harbored it, the Taliban.

Using military force against them is one thing. When you start saying you can target anyone, not just members of groups against which Congress authorized military action, in any country, we’re overstepping the authority that international law and the U.S. Constitution give us.

In a military conflict, the U.S. unquestionably has the authority to kill those fighting against us on the battlefield. But where do we get the right to target and kill a member of al Shabab, a militant group in Somalia, where we are not at war? Is it enough that the group is believed to have some al Qaeda sympathies?

The use of military force is permitted within the confines of war, not outside it. From my view, it’s critical we have clear lines about when it is appropriate to use these practices and when it is not. And thus far, the policy has operated in secret, without any clear lines that we can see.

Myself, being former military, would go after ALL enemies Foreign AND Domestic, Just what he swore an oath to do. 

Q. Was the killing of al-Awlaki legal?

A. The killing of al-Awlaki may or not have been legal. He was far from any battlefield, but news reports state that he was involved in encouraging or directing several attacks, including that of the "Christmas Day bomber," and may have been planning future attacks. If that is true, and if he was effectively a "co-belligerent" fighting with al Qaeda, and if Yemen could not detain him, the attack may well have been legal. But because the entire drone program operates under a shroud of secrecy, we just don’t know.

And regardless of the legality of this particular attack, it ought to be a matter of grave concern to all Americans that our government is killing its own citizens pursuant to a program that it has yet to delineate or defend publicly.

Once again, The President can use the military to protect and defend this country and the Constitution, we've seen terrorist activity  in this country waged on us by fellow Americans Richard Reid, Jose Padilla, Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine.

Q. Was there any question that we had a right to assassinate Osama bin Laden?

Captured Somali Pirates

A. No, he’s the leader of al Qaeda, and we targeted him in Pakistan, from which many attacks have been launched by al Qaeda, so that was permissible. What’s troubling about the debates within the Obama administration is that they’re not talking about targeting al Qaeda leaders, but rank-and-file members of other groups that have in-directly attacked us, in countries far from the military conflict, like Yemen and Somalia.

Q. What would be the consequences to the U.S. of pursuing that strategy?

A. We have to ask: Is this a strategy we would be comfortable with other countries employing? Other countries may already have, or will soon develop, drone capability.

Do we want China, Russia or Pakistan to use targeted missiles to kill people, in other countries, they claim they suspect of terrorism? It’s a very dangerous sort of strategy, which could create more military conflict, war and instability around the world.

Was there anyone Expecting four commercial airliners to be used as manned missile on 9/11?

Q. How then do we effectively pursue those plotting against the United States?

A. Outside of a specific ongoing war, the state generally may not simply kill those it suspects of wrongdoing. We require a trial and appeals process so we don’t punish, much less kill, the wrong people — even for terrorist offenses.

We have successfully dealt with many terrorist threats through the criminal process, working with allies and other nations to bring people to justice. While killing is an inevitable part of war, it is critical that we have clear lines that distinguish war and peacetime authorities. 

Who Tried to Kill Ali Abdullah Saleh?

There aren't many foreigners traveling to Sanaa these days, but one group of outsiders is getting a lot of attention: an FBI forensics team, which arrived last week to investigate the attempted assassination of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is now convalescing in Saudi Arabia.

Evidence from the scene indicates that the explosion may have been caused by a device that was planted inside the mosque on the presidential compound, and not by a mortar shell or rocket, as was initially reported. If true, this means that someone with close access to the president was involved, which raises the question of why members of the Yemeni regime's inner circle -- set to mark its 33rd anniversary in power next month -- now appear intent on destroying each other?

To answer this question, it is necessary to look beyond the protests that have called for Saleh's resignation and instead look at the premises of the political settlement that has held the inner circle together for so long. 

 Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar



The first spectacular rupture within the group came on March 21, when Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar publicly defected from the Saleh regime three days after snipers gunned down peaceful protesters in Sanaa, killing more than 50 people. Ali Mohsen is the country's most powerful military leader and a distant cousin of Saleh. A fight between the two men has been simmering for at least a decade; empathy for the protesters was certainly not the only factor contributing to Ali Mohsen's decision to jump ship. The rivalry between the two former allies was probably more decisive.

By joining the opposition movement, Ali Mohsen and other defectors from the regime have not necessarily heralded a new era for the Yemeni people. Instead, they appear to be settling old scores.

The inner workings of Saleh's Yemen are incredibly opaque. Think of a series of concentric circles with him at their center: That's the regime. Tightly wrapped around the president in the next circle are his close relatives (sons, nephews, half brothers, cousins, and in-laws), and slightly further away is the elite of the Sanhan tribe, to which both Saleh and Ali Mohsen belong. These three circles, consisting of perhaps 50 or so people in total, constitute the regime's inner circle. Some of its members control the country's most sensitive military positions, including those charged with counterterrorism operations in close cooperation with the United States. All have enjoyed the benefits of being deeply enmeshed in the country's formal and informal economy.

The regime has intentionally kept the names of most members of the inner circle out of the public realm, and until several years ago even Saleh's last name -- Afaash -- was treated as though it were a state secret. The likely reason: The name revealed that Saleh is not a sheikh and does not come from a respected tribal pedigree. Moreover, his name also revealed that Ali Mohsen actually sits above the president in the Sanhan tribal hierarchy.

Palace intrigues are the source of continual debate and rumor within Yemen's political classes. These debates tend not to be based on verifiable evidence, however, partly because Saleh so actively prevented the inner circle (other than a selection of his close relatives) from appearing in the media. Until only a few years ago, most Sanaa residents could easily point out Ali Mohsen's house, but most also reported never having seen a photograph of him. This was despite the long shadow that Ali Mohsen cast across Yemeni politics and the active role that was often attributed to him by local analysts and politicians.

Ali Mohsen was vital to Saleh's rise to formal power and the maintenance of his regime. In June 1978, Ahmed al-Ghashmi, president of what was then North Yemen, was assassinated, as was his predecessor eight months earlier. At that time, Maj. Ali Abdullah Saleh was the commander of the Taiz Military District, which granted him access to the Red Sea and the lucrative international smuggling opportunities that went along with it. He was the second-highest-ranking military commander from the Sanhan tribe after Mohammed Ismail al-Qadhi, who was then in the political wilderness for having supported the wrong side in the 1960s civil war.

Ahmed al-Ghashmi,

Upon Ghashmi's assassination, Ali Mohsen managed to secure control of the Central Command Headquarters building in Sanaa. A standoff ensued for 40 days, during which time the Sanhan elite sold assets and gathered cash to purchase support from other military commanders for Saleh to capture the presidency. An agreement was settled between the Sanhan sheikhs involved in the enterprise, which was, according to a Sanhan insider, referred to as "the covenant" (al-ahd). Essentially, it contained an understanding that the Sanhan tribe would stand together under Saleh's leadership and that Ali Mohsen would be next in line to succeed Saleh as president.

The informal succession line did not extend beyond Ali Mohsen, and it is likely that, knowing the short life span of previous Yemeni presidents, the adherents to "the covenant" did not expect their leadership to last for very long. It was widely reported at the time, for example, that when Saleh took office a CIA agent in Sanaa wagered that he would not last six months. Saleh's presidency -- as well as the Sanhan ascendance -- was reasonably expected to be a short-term proposition.

The issue of political succession lay largely dormant until 1999, when Saleh began to push for a series of politically regressive constitutional amendments, one of which was an extension of the presidential term of office from five to seven years. Even though he had been in office since 1978, he was only officially elected for the first time in 1999, meaning that under the amended Constitution he could remain in office until 2013 instead of 2009. This prompted intense speculation that the extension was intended to allow the president's son Ahmed to reach age 40 -- the constitutional minimum age for a Yemeni president -- before Saleh would be compelled to retire.

Some of the elite within the president's tribe, including Ali Mohsen, were reportedly outraged at Saleh's apparent attempt to position his son to succeed him, and this sparked a major factional dispute, though not necessarily because Ali Mohsen wanted the top job for himself. One of Ali Mohsen's most powerful supporters, the commander of the Eastern Region, Qadhi, spoke out and, according to a Sanhan insider, explicitly told Saleh that he was "breaking the covenant." Very shortly after this reported conversation, Qadhi was killed in a military helicopter crash. Although the crash was officially declared an accident, many observers in Yemen saw it as the beginning of other, more subtle moves against Ali Mohsen within the military, as other officers and units loyal to him began be to removed or weakened.

At around the same time, the relationship between Saleh and the country's most prominent tribal figure, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar (the deceased patriarch of the family involved in the recent fighting, and not related to Ali Mohsen), also soured markedly. The Sanhan rivalries increased too, with insiders noting privately that Saleh and his sons and nephews attempted to undermine the influence of the Sanhan old guard using tactics of intimidation and humiliation. The families within the tribe increasingly split between two main factions: the Afaash clan (those related to Saleh) and the Qadhi clan (those related to Ali Mohsen).

Yet even though Saleh's family may try to avenge the attempt on his life, Yemen is not necessarily headed for a long civil war. Despite the situation's obvious combustibility, several factors could still help pull the country back from the brink.

First, though Saleh's son commands the Republican Guard, many of the guardsmen have family and tribal kinsmen in Ali Mohsen's 1st Armored Division and the tribes that support the Ahmar family. The relatively narrow geographical and tribal origins of these three key groups could help to at least limit the potential for resorting to deadly force over an extended period.

Second, though Yemen's famously gun-toting culture is often touted as a reason to fear civil war, it could also work the other way. Ordinary Yemenis are acutely aware that violence can spiral exponentially as a result of small miscalculations. The fact that the protesters have been resolutely nonviolent despite the regime's violence against them is just one indication of how well this is understood.

A final factor is Yemen's political and tribal culture. In tribal conflicts, the goal is less to vanquish an opponent than to demonstrate the ability to apply symbolic force in defense of one's position and then negotiate a solution in which both sides retain honor. Although this tends to lay a foundation for theatrical brinkmanship in which the cost of miscalculation is real and high, it also means that violent outbursts tend to be relatively short-lived. So far, the casualties caused by the fighting between the Ahmars and those loyal to Saleh have been less than one might expect, considering the amount of firepower used.

Yemen's modern history is full of short, sharp conflicts, but it is when outside powers have intervened, as in the 1962-1970 bloody northern civil war -- which became a proxy fight between Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- that war has become most intractable. This observation provides all the more reason to worry about the deep involvement of Saudi Arabia and the United States, with its myopic focus on fighting al Qaeda, in Yemen's crisis. Both players may be helping to set the stage for the regime's internal rivalries to explode -- with dire consequences for the Yemeni people.

Why Yemen’s Revolution Matters

Unrest In Yemen

While Yemen draws headlines and global policy attention as another critical Arab ally to undergo popular unrest, the Obama administration remains focused on one issue: terrorism.

Now that Osama bin Laden is dead, American security forces have intensified their attention on hunting Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Yemeni cleric and member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Although the American media often presents al-Awlaki as the next bin Laden, his importance, especially in Yemen, is vastly blown out of proportion. Even his tribe in the south does not support him. A far more important task for the American public and policymakers would be to understand the mentality of Yemenis who would potentially become his followers and willingly give their lives for his cause.

As civil and democratic protests continue to rage across the country, Americans must catch up with what is actually happening and what matters in Yemen, as well as the region as a whole.

Ali Abdullah Saleh

Every week protesters are killed simply because they seek a dignified life with more freedoms and better access to basic needs. The Yemeni people are protesting against the corrupt, repressive and divisive politics of Yemen’s president of 32 years, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

While Yemenis continue to demand that he relinquish power, he toys with the country, constantly changing his mind on how to end the social and political tension. Even after the international community came together to offer him a dignified way out, he rejected it, playing politics like Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi rather than Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Moammar Gadhafi



President Saleh is not the answer to U.S. concerns over terrorism in Yemen.

Yemen’s revolution began with inspiration from Bouazizi, the vender who burned himself alive after losing all hope for a better life. There are millions of Mohammed Bouazizis across the Arab world, especially in Yemen, where more than 40 percent of the population lives below the food poverty line on less than $2 a day.

It is important that the U.S. pay attention to these dissatisfied Yemenis and support their courageous efforts to improve their lives through civil and democratic means. Otherwise, some might grow frustrated and use violence to achieve change.

This is why revolution in Yemen presents an opportunity for both Yemen and the world. For the first time in Yemen’s history, politics are related to the people’s lives. Yemenis can see a direct connection between the political powers running the country and their personal welfare. During this transitional phase, Yemenis would do anything to improve their lives. Fear is gone; hope has arrived.

But politics are politics, and there is a need for more than emotion or even genuine mobilization of the public. Yemen needs strategies, political maneuvering and savvy that will translate the revolution into a new system that is more responsive to the people’s needs. This is the role of the political parties.

Yet the strongest political party in the revolutionary scene remains Islah, a conservative Islamic party. Although it has toned down its ideological rhetoric and dogma, adopting a more political stance, one cannot ignore Islah’s religious mandate.

Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani

 

For this reason, it is dangerous to allow the passionate revolutionary youth to be overwhelmed by the strategizing of this political party, especially since Islah continues to recognize Sheikh Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” as head of its consultative council. If the political future of Yemen is dominated by Islah, no doubt, the U.S. will find a way — which it is already doing — to deal with this conservative party. And Islah, having already learned the rules of international politics, will accept this reality.

Islah, however, is not the only option for the U.S. or Yemen.

The best way to create political and ideological balance in Yemen — and guarantee that any new government is not sympathetic to al Qaeda — is to strengthen civil society and empower smaller, rising political entities that embrace moderate agendas, including women’s movements. This must be done quickly in order to capture the momentum of this remarkable popular revolution and all the goodwill and positive energy that comes with change.

The longer the U.S. allies itself with President Saleh, the more likely Yemen will experience chaos and civil war and risk becoming a sanctuary for terrorist activity. Today is the best opportunity to achieve democratic change and guarantee a secure and stable Yemen.

Yemen's President Vows No Retreat



President Ali Abdullah Saleh




Yemen's embattled President Ali Abdullah Saleh vowed he would not step down or allow his impoverished nation to become a "failed state" even as urban combat between government troops and armed tribesmen engulfed parts of the capital today.

Both sides raised the specter of civil war as the three-day death toll rose to at least 63. The latest violence comes just days after a failed Arab mediation effort to end the three-month uprising and ease Saleh from power.

Saleh's statement today - read by spokesman Ahmed al-Soufi in a meeting with tribal allies - ruled out a voluntary departure and blasted U.S.-backed efforts to negotiate his exit after 32 years of authoritarian rule.

"I will not leave power and I will not leave Yemen," the statement said. "I don't take orders from outside."

Saleh also threatened that his ouster could turn Yemen into a haven for al-Qaeda - directly touching on U.S. fears that chaos in Yemen could open room for more terrorist footholds. The Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda is linked to the attempted Christmas Day 2009 bombing of an airline over Detroit and explosives found in parcels intercepted last year in Dubai and Britain.

"Yemen will not be a failed state. It will not turn to al-Qaeda refuge," the statement said. Saleh also said he would work to prevent the recent violence from "dragging the country into a civil war."

President Barack Obama

U.S. President Barack Obama has called on Saleh to transfer power - a change from an administration that once considered the Yemeni ruler a necessary ally against terrorism.

Today, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for an immediate end to the fighting, expressing concern that clashes "might further destabilize the situation," U.N. spokesman Martin Nesirky said at U.N. headquarters in New York.

The clashes broke out Monday after Saleh's troops tried to storm the compound of Sheik Sadeq al-Ahmar, the head of Yemen's largest tribe, the Hashid. Hundreds of tribal fighters rushed to the capital's northern Hassaba neighborhood, where clashes erupted with government forces.

Government troops shelled the neighborhood around al-Ahmar's house while gunmen in civilian clothes exchanged gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades with tribal fighters.

The battles have ravaged the area, home to government offices and the headquarters of Saleh's ruling party. The tribal fighters have occupied 16 ministries and other government institutions, while Saleh's forces have used the interior ministry as their front-line base.



Pro-Saleh force checkpoint

 Some military units also appear to have broken ranks and joined the opposition. One breakaway unit trucked in stones to block streets in attempts to prevent government troops from moving in heavy weapons. Pro-Saleh forces, meanwhile, set up checkpoints in other areas, witnesses said.

Gregory Johnsen, an expert on Yemen at Princeton University, said the current fighting could spread quickly if any of Yemen's other armed groups jump in, especially if the first armored division of Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a former Saleh confidant who sided with the protesters in March. He is not related to the tribal chief.

"If the first armored division gets involved, then it is no longer just a two-sided fight," he said. "It gets much more complicated and the possibility of escalation across the country goes up significantly."

The fighting sent dozens of families fleeing the area and seeking refuge outside the capital. Eyewitnesses said that all roads entering Sanaa were blocked by pro-government Republican Guards, which are under the command of Saleh's son, leaving hundreds of Yemenis trying to enter the capital stranded and forced to spend the night in their cars.

Refugee tends her sheep outside Sanaa, Yemen



The fighting also appears to be widening into nearby neighborhoods. Volleys of mortars hit an army unit that had defected to the opposition side in the district of al-Nahda, killing three and injuring 10 others, according to a military official.

An airport official said that fighting north of the city forced a flight from the northern city of Hodeida not to land and return home.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to talk to the media.

Yemen's Interior Ministry said 14 soldiers have been killed. Al-Ahmar's spokesman Abdel-Qawi al-Qaisi said 46 tribal fighters had been killed - bringing the death toll since Monday to 63. Scores more were injured.

Yemen's Interior Ministry blamed the tribal fighters for the violence. In a statement, al-Ahmar accused the regime of trying to "ignite discord and civil war between Yemenis."

The violence ended the most recent effort to negotiate and end to the crisis, which has struck Yemen's already staggering economy.

A delegation of tribal chiefs sent by Saleh to negotiate a cease-fire with al-Ahmar quit their mission today after saying government troops fired on them near al-Ahmar's house.

"It became clear to us that the president was not serious about the cease-fire and we the mediators decided to stop mediating and place the responsibility on the president," the group said in a statement.

The violence follows Saleh's refusal to sign a U.S.-backed agreement pushed by Yemen's powerful Gulf neighbors that would have seen him leave power in exchange from immunity from prosecution.

Other groups also criticized the attack on al-Ahmar's house that touched off the clashes.

A group of opposition parties that have sought to negotiate with Saleh called the attack "a planned crime of official violence to take revenge" al-Ahmar for supporting the anti-Saleh protesters.

Thousands of protesters marched through the capital Wednesday, not far from the clashes, calling on Saleh to step down. Protest leader Mana al-Matari said the marchers remained committed to nonviolence and accused Saleh of fueling the unrest.

"The president seeks to ignite the military situation and cause a war to serve his own interests and distract from issue of his stepping down," he said.

Should the U.S. Intervene in Yemen?



Awaiting Orders







It is a dangerous time in Yemen for the United States. On Sunday, armed thugs loyal to faltering president Ali Abdullah Saleh marched on the embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Sanaa, where diplomats were preparing for the signing ceremony of the Gulf Cooperation Council deal that they hoped would resolve the ongoing political crisis between Saleh's government and the protests sweeping the country. The diplomats, who included the U.S., British, and European Union ambassadors, were trapped inside for two hours before being evacuated by helicopter. Earlier this month, documents purportedly from the Saleh government authorizing the arming of political supporters leaked and were published online.

General Abdul Latif al Zayyani

After being evacuated, the delegation of national ambassadors and GCC Secretary General Abdul Latif al Zayyani met with Saleh at the presidential palace, where he had announced that he would be willing to sign the GCC-brokered agreement, after backing out on two previous occasions. Under the conditions of the agreement, all protests would cease, a new unity government would be put in place, and Saleh would tender his resignation to parliament within one month and new elections would be held. Instead, in a televised statement, Saleh warned of civil war if protests persisted. He then refused to sign the reconciliation deal, imposing new conditions for his signature.

The GCC has previously stated that if Saleh refused to sign the deal on Sunday, they would withdraw from the reconciliation process. One diplomat said that the effort had "failed."

Sunday's events came three days after President Obama reiterated his administration's formal position that Saleh must go. So far, the United States has worked through regional allies; advocating for the Gulf Cooperation Council brokered agreement and pressuring an obstinate Saleh to uphold his stated commitment to sign the deal and leave office. With this latest collapse of the reconciliation effort, the GCC's role faltering, and violence escalating, U.S. officials may need to reevaluate their approach to Yemen.


Made in USA

 The United States begins at a disadvantage. Its close alliance with Saleh has done much to discredit it with the opposition groups that have camped in streets of Sanaa since early February. Protesters have been photographed holding tear gas canisters and less-lethal rubber shot shells labeled "Made in USA." If the United States does not take a proactive stance that goes beyond rhetorical calls for a peaceable transition, these images of spent munitions may determine how the Yemeni people remember the United States' role.

The United States' options are limited, as they always are in Yemen. Libyan leader Muammar Gadahfi's use of airstrikes to suppress protests and revolt in Libya became the justification for an international intervention. But, despite at least two occasions of the Yemeni government using air strikes against rebels since May 1, the institution of a no-fly zone would do little in Yemen, where the most damaging violence has been inflicted by rooftop snipers. However, the United States cannot simply walk away from Yemen - it has a vested national security interest in pursuing al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which operates from Yemen's rural interior. Days after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, on May 5, the U.S. launched a missile strike from an unmanned drone in Abdan, in Yemen's Shabwa province, targeting AQAP propagandist Anwar al Awlaki. It missed; al Awlaki remains at large, as does the leadership of the AQAP organization.

The best course of action for the U.S. may well be diplomatic. The U.S. will have to act quickly to force Saleh out of the executive office and help negotiate an inclusive, post-Saleh government; failure to secure Saleh's departure will only worsen and prolong the violence preceding his inevitable fall. Waiting only enables Saleh's strategy of outlasting the opposition's unity, and as Saleh escalates, the window for the U.S. to act productively dwindles.

As this process continues, there should be an understanding that the longer Saleh waits to leave, the worse his options will be in a final settlement. The worst-case for the Yemeni president is the opposition's stated intention, to overthrow Saleh and hold trials for him and senior members of his regime.

The time is right for the U.S. and its allies - whether Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the European Union, or the United Nations - to intervene diplomatically and negotiate Saleh's resignation. Leaders in the secessionist Southern Mobility Movement have courted U.S. patronage in the past. Today, a Yemeni youth council sent an impassioned plea for intervention to President Obama. This opportunity will be lost, though, if the opposition fragments, which it could as time continues.

The unity within Yemen's protest movement will be tested in the coming days. It is a strange, fractious group to begin with, composed of southern secessionists, the remains of the Yemeni Socialist Party, Islamists, tribal leaders, military officers, and a previously voiceless youth. The only thing these groups share is their desire to oust their president. Saleh is doing his utmost to wait them out and let their differences divide the movement from within. Fragmentation would increase the risk of violence, raising tensions along the north-south cultural and political fault line, and possibly splintering the various tribal rivalries latent within the opposition movement.

For now, though, the opposition remains united. Protests in Sanaa on Friday, May 6, were held "in solidarity with the South." Sunday was "Unification Day," a Yemeni national holiday celebrating the consolidation of North and South Yemen in 1990 to form the modern state. How long that solidarity and unity will last, if it can survive a civil war, and if Saleh can outlast it, remains to be seen. What does seem clear is that both Saleh and the opposition have independently chosen strategies of escalation to break the stalemate, presenting the horrifying question that always accompanies escalation: where does this end? The unification of the country commemorated on Sunday led to a civil war in 1994; unity is never certain in Yemen.

Civil wars have occurred in Yemen twice in the past fifty years. If violence consumes the country, it would likely begin with loyalist and defected military forces fighting against one another, as they have already begun to in scattered incidents. Worse, it could deteriorate into fighting involving less official actors -- the SMM, various tribes, or even the violent jihadist groups that Saleh enlisted to help fight the 1994 war. If the unity of the opposition fails in a civil war, it could quickly become a war of all against all, with a weak or non-functioning government overseeing a country with a dwindling food and water supply and with al Qaeda elements in its rural areas. This is the worst of all possible worlds for Yemen, and it is everything the United States and other regional stakeholders stand to lose if they do not seize this moment.