Showing posts with label Decline of Presidential Support in Syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Decline of Presidential Support in Syria. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

Bashar al-Assad Cannot Survive Much Longer





Rifaat al-Assad
Rifaat al-Assad said that the level of violence on the streets was too high for his nephew to survive.
Mr. Assad has lived in exile since he unsuccessfully tried to seize power from his brother, Hafez, in the 1980s.
In February 1982, he led a military assault on Hama to suppress an uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood, leaving between 10,000 and 25,000 people dead.
Jakob Kellenberger


Meanwhile, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Jakob Kellenberger, is meeting top Syrian officials in Damascus to try to get them to allow aid workers better access to those who have been wounded or displaced by the conflict.








Mr. Kellenberger will also press the Syrian authorities to implement a daily two-hour ceasefire, as stipulated in the peace plan proposed by the UN and Arab League envoy, Kofi Annan.
Kofi Annan


On Monday, Mr. Annan urged the UN Security council to set a deadline of 10 April for the plan to come into force. Syria has agreed to the deadline.
Mr. Annan's spokesman, Ahmed Fawzi, said yesterday that an advance team from the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would arrive in Damascus "in the next 48 hours" to discuss the deployment of international monitors.
Although Rifaat al-Assad tried to oust Hafez in a coup while he was recovering from a heart attack and was effectively sent into exile in 1984, he was only formally stripped of his position as vice-president in 1998.
Bashar ai-Assad


When Bashar became president following his father's death in 2000, Rifaat criticized the succession as a "real farce and an unconstitutional piece of theatre". He considered himself the legitimate successor.
BBC Middle East editor Jeremy Bowen says that on one level, it is not surprising that Rifaat - from the vantage point of a gilded exile on one of Paris's smartest avenues - has harsh words for the president.
But the points Rifaat makes are widely accepted among the opponents of the Assad regime both in the West and in the Arab world.
The problems are now general to all parts of Syria - there are no places that have escaped violence - so I don't think Bashar can stay in power much longer" Mr. Assad said in an interview with the BBC. "I would say, though, that he should stay so he can co-operate with a new government and offer the experience he has."
Support For Assad


Rifaat insisted that the Assad family was still "pretty much accepted by the Syrian people.
A commission should go from the Arab League and the [UN] Security Council to monitor free and transparent elections.
Then you will see that the Assad family has got much more importance and support than some of the meaningless figures [of the opposition Syrian National Council] who we see on TV screens now."
What Rifaat meant by that was that he could make a good president - highly unlikely given his years of exile. The SNC has called for Rifaat al-Assad to be subjected to international sanctions like current senior officials in the Syrian government because of his past crimes.
On Monday, Mr. Annan told the UN Security Council that President Assad had agreed to withdraw security forces from major population centers by 10 April.
UN officials and diplomats said the monitors would probably be drawn from other peacekeeping forces in the region and could not be established without an end to the fighting, agreement by all parties and a Security Council mandate.
chairwoman Susan Rice


"We hope that the Syrian authorities will implement fully the commitments that they have made without any conditions," said US permanent representative and Security Council chairwoman Susan Rice. "And should they do so, we will expect the opposition to follow suit within 48 hours."
Mr. Annan's spokesman, Ahmed Fawzi, later said Damascus had committed to begin withdrawing its forces on Sunday and to finish by 10 April, with a general ceasefire within 48 hours contingent on that withdrawal.
Ms Rice also pointed out that the ceasefire was only part of Mr. Annan's peace plan, which also calls for a political process to address the aspirations of the Syrian people, release of detainees, delivery of humanitarian aid, free movement for journalists, and right to protest.
"We have seen promises made and promises broken," she said. "We have seen commitments to end violence followed by massive intensification of violence. The proof is in the actions, not the words."
Free Syrian Army


On Sunday, Gulf Arab states agreed to pay the salaries and other costs of the rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA). The money will be distributed through the main opposition coalition, the Syrian National Council (SNC).
The decision was announced at a meeting in Istanbul of the "Friends of Syria" - a group of 83 countries backing political change.

Monday, June 13, 2011

U.S. awaits world support to step in on Syrian strife







Syrian President Bashar "Butcher" Assad
Each day brings more atrocities in Syria. Fears of an imminent massacre by the regime has led thousands of refugees to flee into Turkey over the past few days. Yet the international community has been reluctant to outright demand that Syrian President Bashar Assad step down.
Daniel Kurtzer


Daniel Kurtzer, who has served as U.S. ambassador to Egypt and Israel and now heads Middle East policy studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, spoke with editorial writer Julie O’Connor about why our ambiguous role in Libya has prevented stronger action in Syria.

Q. It was the fear of atrocities that led the West to intervene in Libya. Yet in Syria, where there’s already substantial evidence of civilian killings and torture, we’ve held back. Why this caution?

A. There are still significant holes in the analysis and policy underpinning what we’re doing in Libya. We intervened there on the basis of a vague notion, an international law called the Responsibility to Protect. But it’s very unclear what that means in practical terms. In Libya, we’re using it as a cover to support the rebels and oppose the regime, and in some ways, we’re using it for regime change — which is not actually what it’s supposed to represent. Given these uncertainties, there’s also going to be uncertainty about starting down that road in Syria. There’s been much greater difficulty in bringing about an international consensus to act.

The idea that civilians were being targeted by the regime, especially in Benghazi, was clearly a major factor in our intervention in Libya. The problem is, what do you do after you’ve protected that population? Do you then stop, or do you proceed?

Q. Do you believe the situation in Syria demonstrates the limitations of U.S. power?

A. I think it demonstrates the limitations of operating on the basis of this Responsibility to Protect. It’s not just U.S. policy; it’s a much larger question. If there’s something called a Responsibility to Protect, does it only extend to cases in which you can have an international consensus? Does it allow for the U.S. to act unilaterally? And is it wise to do so?

Q. Some say Turkey’s alliance with Syria’s protestors may lead Washington and the West to take a more assertive stance on Assad. Do you think that will happen?

A. It’s hard to tell. Turkey abstained on the United Nations Security Council’s resolution that authorized the use of force in Libya. While Turkey did not block NATO from acting in Libya, it certainly was not happy about it. The difference now may be the severity of what’s happening in Syria. Also, there’s an immediate impact on Turkey, from Syrian refugees crossing the border. If the Turks are now as concerned as we are about what’s going on in Syria, it may build on our NATO alliance and lead us to join forces in a way that’s helpful in relation to Syria.

Q. The U.S. and much of Europe have asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn the regime’s attacks, suggesting they amount to crimes against humanity. Is that likely to pass? What effect would it have?

A. I don’t know if it will pass, but it seems to have the support of a number of council members already. It may not stop Syria, but it certainly has an impact. Syria is a member of the international community and is concerned with public opinion, and may see this as the first step toward stronger sanctions and actions.

Q. Why not call for military action?

A. I think the U.S. is being careful about saying anything about military actions until we can build international support for it.

Q. Human Rights Watch recently came out with a report recounting Syrian war crimes, many against children. What has been the impact of the regime’s killings of children like 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib, whose body showed signs of torture?

A. I think it’s played a tremendous role in eroding any kind of potential sympathy for the regime. It certainly burst the balloon of people’s beliefs that Assad was somehow a different kind of dictator, a benevolent dictator. Nobody should have believed it, and certainly nobody believes it now.

Q. How likely do you think it is a repeat of the infamous 1982 Hama massacre ordered by Assad’s father, which killed tens of thousands?

A. It’s quite possible. The Syrian government is showing no restraint, and it’s only a question of magnitude. If they have to kill a lot of people, they will. They’re showing no reason to suggest otherwise.

Q. Assad paints a picture of a bloody sectarian war developing out of this uprising if he falls from power. What are the chances of that?

A. I think it’s unlikely. He’s using it as an excuse, 100 percent. It’s a classic that goes back 300 years, to the French Revolution: “Après moi, le déluge,” meaning “After me, the flood.” That’s what French King Louis XV argued. It’s a false argument always used by dictators to justify continued repression.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Syria: Assad Has To Go






President Barack Obama, in what is being described by administration officials as “a major address,” will talk about the political upheavals in the Middle East. Better late than never.

However, you get an uneasy sense that on the most potentially significant uprising of the moment, the one taking place in Syria, Obama will not say very much more than he has until now. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,



Catherine Ashton

That doesn’t mean Washington will not raise the heat on
Syria’s President Bashar Assad. This week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, alongside the European Union
foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, noted, “Assad talks about reform, but his heavy-handed brutal crackdown shows his true intentions.” She added, “They have embraced the worst tactics of their Iranian ally and they have refused to honor the legitimate aspirations of their own people in Syria.”  




The U.S. and the Europeans have indicated that a new round of sanctions is forthcoming, and these will even cover Assad himself. This is too little too late. The U.S. and leading European states such as France and the United Kingdom must formally demand that the Syrian president step down. By ordering, or allowing, his army and security forces to open fire on unarmed, peaceful demonstrators, Assad has forsaken all legitimacy. Something is fundamentally broken in Syria, and delaying recognition of that reality may be ruinous.

We’ve heard Obama administration officials declare lately that they have little leverage over Syria. But nations build leverage, they don’t just pick it out of the ether. If there is one country that has the means to bring the Arab states, Europe, and Russia and China into some sort of concerted effort to hasten Assad’s exit from power, and more importantly, to help Syrians who oppose their regime organize a smooth transition to a democratic, pluralistic, order, it’s the United States. In fact only the United States can take such measures.

That’s not to say that such a process would be easy. However, enough states have enough of a stake in avoiding the further disintegration of Syria, one that might well lead to widespread sectarian conflict, that it is entirely possible to push for a successful end to Assad rule.

The Arab countries would play an essential role. The Obama administration could fashion an Arab consensus by portraying a change in Syria as fatal for Iranian interests in the Levant. Despite Saudi-American tensions in recent months, there would be much sympathy with this approach in Riyadh, helping to unlock Gulf skepticism. What bothers the Saudis is that they see an Obama administration without any discernible strategy to contain Iranian power. An American initiative to use the Syrian crisis as a means of countering the influence of Iran and Hezbollah could reverse this sentiment. It would likely also earn considerable support from Egypt, which views Iran as a major spoiler on the Palestinian front.
French foreign minister, Alain Juppe


Russia and China have been recalcitrant at the United Nations, blocking all efforts to condemn Syria. This week the French foreign minister, Alain Juppe, announced that France and the U.K. were close to getting nine council votes for a resolution on Syria. Moscow and Beijing have threatened to wield their veto, but there is probably more room for Washington and the Europeans to find a middle ground than is apparent. Ultimately, the Assad regime is not more important to the Russians and Chinese than Iran, and yet the Security Council repeatedly managed to approve tough resolutions against Tehran.

The case that could be put to Russia and China is this: The Assad regime, by escalating the repression of its own population, has made a peaceful resolution to the revolt in Syria highly improbable. Nor is the violence even working to quell demonstrations against Assad rule. Worse, the Syrian leadership has exacerbated sectarian antagonisms through its brutal retaliatory actions. This could have dangerous repercussions in neighboring states with mixed societies, heightening regional instability, therefore endangering international security. 
One way to quell Assad's oppression

Neither Russia nor China would want to risk valuable political capital by defending a despotic Syrian regime against hardening international recognition that Bashar Assad’s days in office are numbered. A crucial ingredient in bringing about this Russian and Chinese realization would be an adamant American and European, perhaps even an Arab, statement that it is time for fundamental transformation in Damascus; not bogus “reform” that the Assad family sees merely as a means of neutralizing dissent.

The doubters would respond that the Assads have great latitude to adopt a scorched earth policy to remain in place. They do, but as the Syrian situation festers and worsens, as it almost certainly will do, we should not underestimate the willingness of family members to look for escape routes. This is where international justice and diplomacy comes in: the first to limit the Syrian regime’s destructiveness; the second to negotiate an end to Assad rule by offering key figures possible incentives. Arab states and Turkey could play a significant role in this, but Obama alone can bring all the pieces together.

The progress would be dynamic. As the Assads watch Arab governments, the United States and Europe moving forcibly against them, followed by Russia and China, they would necessarily begin recalculating their options. They have tried to suffocate the uprising in Syria, but their efforts have gone nowhere. Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of the Syrian president, has warned that Israel would suffer from the Assads’ departure. That did little to keep the Israelis on the regime’s side, and the border incidents last weekend, which Israel and the United States blamed on Syria, only made matters worse.

Three Faces Of Evil

A civil war in Syria would be a catastrophe, as much for a majority of Syrians as for the regime’s minority Alawite community. The Assads have boldly implied that it must either be them dominating in Damascus or chaos. Obama and the Arabs above all must quickly shoot down that mad thought. Syria can become democratic without more carnage, but it does need outside assistance. The Assads have to sense that their “Samson option,” that of bringing down the temple over everyone’s head, will fail. For the region’s sake it has to fail.