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Acemoglu and Robinson suggest
it’s none of these – rather, the real reason behind the poverty trap and
significant between-nation differences lies in the role of political and
economic institutions. Politics and the formation of political institutions
take centre stage in their book, which formulates the thesis that only within
an inclusive political system is it possible for nations to achieve prosperity.
The opposite scenario will occur under extractive political institutions where
wealth will be accumulated within a narrow ruling elite which will aim to
preserve its power thus sentencing a nation to persistent poverty.
In the very beginning of the book the
authors hint to the reader how it will be organized – through a series of
historical case studies upon which they illustrate their theory of institutional
change and the consequential success or failure of nations. It starts with the
example of Nogales, a city on the US-Mexican border, which is split in half by
a fence. One city, in the same geographical position, characterized by the same
cultural upbringings, same population, same diseases, but one part three times
richer, much healthier, safer, and with higher living standards. The crucial
difference is the very border separating the two parts of the city depicting
the different institutional settings within them.
North and South Korea; Can you see the Difference? |
The colonization strategy of the English
was the same as of the Spaniards – extract the resources and force the
indigenous population to work for the colonial elite, which would, along with
the Crown, obtain maximum benefits from it. This strategy worked well in India
and Africa, but it failed in North America. First of all, they were late. North
America was less attractive and much scarcer in gold than South America. In
addition, the Native Americans put up far greater resistance and more
importantly didn’t allow themselves to become enslaved and forced into manual
labour for the newcomers.
Daron Acemoglu |
These initial institutional
differences manifested through the limitation of political power, democratic
principles, and economic incentives that paved the different development paths
of US and Mexico, generating the crucial difference between the two parts of
the city of Nogales.
An intriguing case study approach
analyzed through the lens of institutional formation is the framework used
throughout the book. The emphasis is on how inclusive political institutions
can lead to inclusive economic institutions which will lay the foundations of
wealth creation and sustainable growth. The combination of inclusive political
and economic institutions shapes the incentives needed for a society to
prosper. If people have their wealth expropriated, they will lack the
incentives to create or sustain it. They will fail to innovate and fail to
achieve progress. People need an initial set of institutions to reduce
uncertainty and maintain stability.
The two examples exists side-by-side |
Acemoglu and Robinson formulate their
central hypothesis around the fact that a strong set of economic institutions
which will guide incentives towards creating wealth can only be achieved
through more political freedom. Political inclusiveness and the distribution of
political power within a society are the key elements that will determine the
success or the failure of nations.
The outcome of this insightful thesis
originating from the works of Adam Smith can often depend on random historical
events. They refer to these as the critical junctures of history that exploited
the initial small institutional differences and led to diverging development
paths of nations. One interesting example of a critical juncture that probably
contributed to the divergence between Western and Eastern Europe was the
bubonic plague, better known as the Black Death, in the 14th century. Another
example is the aforementioned different colonization pattern in many countries,
the most notable one being between North and South America.
In their pursuit of an explanation for
the role of politics in development, the authors touch upon other dominant
theories that have tried to explain poor growth and under-development. They
stress three approaches: (1) the geographical position of the country
(countries in the sub-tropical area), which blames exposure to rough climate,
barren land and tropical diseases; (2) the cultural attribute, where the
population is to be blamed for not being hard-working (less productive) due to
their ethical, religious or cultural boundaries (a famous example here is Max
Weber’s Protestant ethic argument); and (3) the ignorance of the country’s
ruling elites, implying that if they had better economic advice, they would be
able to emerge from poverty. They also touch upon the dual economy paradigm that
blamed African underdevelopment on the co-existence of two sectors within an
economy between which social mobility was almost impossible.
Each of these arguments is found faulty
by the authors. The rule of a narrow elite that organizes the society for its
own rent-extracting interest is a common trajectory every nation followed on
its road to poverty. The differences between the two parts of Nogales, two
Koreas, or East and West Germany cannot be explained by geography, culture,
diseases or ignorance – it could only be explained by a different set of
political institutions that resulted in different economic outcomes. As for the
African dual economy paradigm, the dual economy was artificially created by the
ruling (white) elite that maintained extractive political institutions.
The problem isn’t that poor nations
remain poor because of outside (or inside) exploitation, economic ignorance or
laziness of the population. It lies in the role of politics, and how the ruling
elite will organize the country’s political and economic institutions. If
political institutions are organized as extractive and concentrated in the
hands of a narrow elite, then economic institutions will only serve the purpose
of the ruling elites extracting the maximum wealth for themselves. If they are
organized as inclusive, power being dispersed among the many rather than
concentrated among the few, then this institutional environment will create
incentives of inclusive economic institutions, where innovation and creative
destruction will ensure the creation of sustainable economic growth and
development. Becoming a rich nation necessitates the overthrow of the ruling
elites and the distribution of power and political rights evenly within a
society. The government has to become accountable and responsive to its people,
who can then use this security and stability to advance on the economic
opportunities available to them.
However, the authors do admit that
growth can be achieved within a set of extractive political institutions. The
elites can simply reallocate resources into temporary highly productive
activities under their control (e.g. from agriculture to industry). But the
problem is that this growth is unsustainable in the long run. When the economy
runs out of steam, so will rapid growth and the country will first be exposed
to an economic and ultimately to a political crisis. The example of the rapid
growth of Soviet Russia illustrates this point. It wasn’t driven by innovation,
but state control and when the foundations for growth were exhausted, nothing
came to replace it. The authors predict the same thing happening to China. Even
though China is different than Soviet Russia, as it deploys some inclusive
economic institutions, the political elites still constrain creative destruction.
They mention the example of a Chinese entrepreneur who wanted to compete with
big, inefficient state-owned steel companies and ended up in prison as a
result.
The Chinese anti-entrepreneurship climate, censorship of the media, and
technological growth based on adoption of technologies rather than innovation
are all signals of an extractive political system in which growth is not
sustainable. China can overcome this and reach sustainable growth if it manages
to undergo a political reform that will introduce more individual and political
freedom. Until then, they are destined to repeat the Soviet scenario.
The book develops as a fascinating
storyline comprising of a multitude of vivid historical examples that support
the central thesis of the authors. After identifying the main framework of the
analysis in the first four chapters, it takes the reader on a journey through
history featuring a number of famous historical and more recent stories of
success and failure. This gives the reader an opportunity to see how politics
can indeed play an important part in the development of a society.
We see the same historical pattern
reoccurring in Venice and Ancient Rome, in Ethiopia and Mayan city-states, in
Soviet Russia and Congo, in 18th century Spain, absolutist Austro-Hungary or
tsarist Russia. The common characteristic that led them to failure was the
extractiveness of their political institutions. Even if they did briefly
experience rapid growth (such as the absolutist monarchies or Soviet Russia),
this growth was temporary and unsustainable, unless a path towards
inclusiveness followed. When Ancient Rome, Venice and the Mayan city-states had
even partially inclusive institutions that offered the proper incentives for
growth, they managed to experience it. However, when they switched to
authoritarianism and usurpation of power by the elites, conflicts emerged and the
downfall of their societies began. Inclusiveness was replaced by extractiveness
and consequently development was reversed.
In England, something different
happened. Whilst in other countries repression was the dominant type of social
order, in England the demand for more property rights and a greater political
voice set the stage for sustained growth and prosperity.
Creative destruction and technological
innovation made people richer, led to a new distribution of wealth, and more
importantly new distribution of power in the society. The elites, afraid of
losing their privileges, opposed this process. They felt threatened and formed
barriers to innovation. But in England, through political conflict, the rising
wealth of merchants and manufactures was able to overcome this opposition and
constrain the power of the sovereign, initiating the beginning of a new
historical era.
This is precisely why the Industrial
Revolution started in England, not anywhere else in the World. The Industrial
Revolution developed on the trails of the Glorious Revolution. It was the
importance of a broad coalition representing the people that succeeded. If
there had not been such a broad coalition, one elite would have simply
overtaken the other and continued with extractive institutions (as happened
briefly during the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell). Irreversible political
change and the switch to inclusiveness transformed the economic incentives in
the society and created enormous wealth and prosperity.
But not all countries followed this
rapid development and not all countries embraced the benefits of the Industrial
Revolution, some even for a long time. It is due to these defining moments of
history (critical junctures) where the authors explain why all those countries
that developed on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire tend to be relatively
impoverished (provided that they are not oil exporters). The Ottoman Empire,
instead of embracing change, felt threatened by it and sentenced its minions to
another 200 years of extraction and poverty. The opposition to the elites in
the Ottoman Empire never grew as strong as it did in England, which is why
inclusive institutions never developed there. The same is true for a multitude
of countries at the time, including Spain, Austro/Hungary, Russia or China.
Wherever those with political power felt
threatened by technology and innovation, they prevented it, and by doing so
they effectively prevented wealth creation and prosperity.
The summing-up of their analysis is
through explaining the vicious and the virtuous cycles of prosperity. Whenever
inclusive institutions are present, the virtuous cycle will create positive
feedback loops that will prevent the elites overcoming them. It will make sure
that inclusive institutions expand and become persistent. Similarly, in the
case of extractive institutions vicious cycles will generate negative feedback
loops that will prevent progress.
In order for the virtuous cycle to work
the first precondition is to have pluralism, which will constitute the rule of
law and lead to more inclusive economic institutions. Inclusive economic
institutions will remove the need for extraction since those in power will gain
little but lose a lot if engaged in a repression and constraining democracy.
Finally, they also recognize the importance of free media to provide
information on threats against inclusive institutions.
The virtuous cycle explains how the
reforms of the political system in England or the US became irreversible, since
those in power understood that any possible deviation would endanger their own
position. The examples of British consolidation and its slow, contingent path
to democracy in which the people gradually demanded and gradually received more
rights; or the trust-busting in the US in the beginning of the 20th century; or
the failed attempts of President Roosevelt to limit the power of the US Supreme
Court illustrate this point.
Pluralism and the rule of law were
critical conditions leading to the limits of political power that made the
virtuous cycle possible in the US and Britain. And this was precisely why
Fujimori’s Peru, Chavez’s Venezuela or Peron’s Argentina failed. They failed to
create institutions to limit political power.
These systems developed
extractive institutions and generated a vicious cycle in which the ruling elite
had no constraints on power and had great incentives for expropriation and
wealth extraction. Even if this elite were to be overthrown by a revolution,
the “iron law of oligarchy” implied that a new elite would simple replace the
old one and continue in its extraction, sometimes even worse than under the old
elite. This is why the authors are somewhat sceptical of the ability of the
Arab Spring to produce the necessary shift towards inclusiveness.
Once again the authors convince the
reader in the mechanism of the negative feedback loop and the iron law of
oligarchy through a multitude of cases ranging from Sierra Leone, Guatemala,
Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, Columbia, Argentina, Egypt and even slavery in
the US South. However, the vicious cycle in the US South was easier to break
due to the existence of inclusive institutions on the federal level. The Civil
Rights Movement generated equality in the South and paved the way for economic
growth.
Another good example of “breaking the
mould” is Botswana, where the natural resource course didn’t lead to extraction
from colonists or usurpation of power over who gets to control resource
extraction and enrich upon it. They have managed to seize their critical
juncture – postcolonial independence – and used it to develop inclusive
institutions.
The authors refrain from trying to write
a recipe for development since there is no such thing. Their theory based on
critical junctures and specific historical paths loses predictive power since it
is hard to tell which countries could break the mould anytime soon. The theory
can say which countries are likely to stay poor for a long time but it cannot
really answer the question on what will follow after events like the Arab
Spring. A range of factors will decide whether the Arab countries undergo a
gradual path towards inclusiveness or whether the iron rule of oligarchy prevails.
Finally, prosperity cannot be engineered
by international institutions with a recipe for reform or foreign aid; it has to
come from empowerment to the people and their inclusiveness in the political
process. Once a broad coalition is formed this will enable the inclusive
institutions to persist and the political reforms to become irreversible. One
can conclude that based on this approach, inclusive economic and political
institutions develop spontaneously, while extractive institutions are imposed
by outside coercion. The road to prosperity is thus always achieved through
more political, individual and economic freedom.
The only part the authors did not cover
in more detail is what happens after political and economic inclusiveness are
attained, when certain elites or organized interest groups try to obtain
political support to serve their own self-interest. An answer from the book
would probably be that this scenario falls out of the general definition of
inclusive political institutions, where the media is (partially) captured and
where narrow self-interests can curtail the system in order to extract certain
benefit. It is here that their framework could be extended, but the already
large scope and size of the book prevent the authors from engaging so deeply
into the subject.
The framework used in the book is based
on a rigorous fifteen-year research process conducted by the authors and
examined previously in some of their earlier, more analytical work. Regular
readers of their work will recognize many of the ideas on the consolidation of
democracies and political transitions coming from their 2006 book, Origins of
Dictatorships and Democracy, along with many academic articles. Why Nations
Fail builds on these findings thus providing the crowning achievement in their
political economy theory. It is a recommended read to all professions and
anyone interested in finding out why some nations are rich while others are
poor.
Even though the book lacks academic
rigour in supporting the theory and proving the causality of certain events and
their further manifestation, such virtues were probably not the authors’
objectives.
For anyone interested in the academic
proofs behind certain historical events, I recommend their earlier work in
which the analytical framework can be thoroughly analyzed.
This book has different goals. Its emphasis on historical case studies to make it more interesting to the general reader succeeds in transferring the idea to all those outside the economic and political science profession. They have managed to summarize their theory and make the case for institutional change, while presenting it in an understandable, yet brilliant way for all those who are not economists. That alone marks the book as a success.
This book has different goals. Its emphasis on historical case studies to make it more interesting to the general reader succeeds in transferring the idea to all those outside the economic and political science profession. They have managed to summarize their theory and make the case for institutional change, while presenting it in an understandable, yet brilliant way for all those who are not economists. That alone marks the book as a success.